A U.S. court document. Read it and understand it

U.S. complaint document. 

Here you will find an interesting U.S. court document (to be precise, a copy of complaint submitted to the N.Y. supreme court). Quite interesting both for the structure of the document (to be compared to that of the italian documents) and for the subject involved (talking about russian Mafija). Welcome back folks!

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK __________________________________________
MORGENTHOW AND LATHAM, NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE GROUP, and ORIENTAL XL FUNDS, Plaintiffs, - against - THE BANK OF NEW YORK COMPANY, INC., THE BANK OF NEW YORK, and JOINT STOCK BANK INKOMBANK, Defendants. _____________________________________	Index No. 604598/00  VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Morgenthow and Latham, New York International Insurance Group, and Oriental XL Funds, by their attorneys, for their complaint against the defendants, respectfully allege, upon personal knowledge as to themselves and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CLAIMS This action is brought by three private investment trusts to recover losses proximately caused by the fraud of the defendants. Essentially, defendants Bank of New York Company, Inc. and Bank of New York (hereinafter referred to as "BONY"), acting in concert with corrupt officials of Joint Stock Bank Inkombank ("Inkombank"), a now defunct Russian Bank which maintained a correspondent banking relationship with BONY, used BONY's credibility and stature fraudulently to induce the plaintiffs to refrain from redeeming a $40 million investment in Inkombank, by knowingly misrepresenting and concealing from the plaintiffs material facts which were justifiably relied upon by the plaintiffs to their ultimate detriment and damage. Specifically, defendants (i) knowingly and falsely misrepresented to the plaintiffs that Inkombank was a sound, reputable and reliable financial institution, and (ii) concealed from the plaintiffs that Inkombank's senior management were actively engaged in unlawful and criminal activities, which included, inter alia, theft of Inkombank's assets and money laundering. Ultimately, Inkombank collapsed in October of 1998, as a result of the aforesaid conduct and the systematic looting of its assets by the management of Inkombank. As a proximate cause of the defendants' fraud, plaintiffs suffered a total loss of their investment and the returns to be paid thereon. PARTIES Plaintiffs Morgenthow and Latham ("MORGENTHOW"") is a private investment trust declared under the laws of The Cayman Islands. Oriental XL Funds ("ORIENTAL" XL") is a private investment trust declared under the laws of The Cayman Islands. New York International Insurance Group ("NY International") is a private investment trust declared under the laws of The Cayman Islands. The current trustee of Morgenthow, Oriental XL and NY International is Boris Kuznetsov, whose New York address is c/o Law Offices of Alexander Fishkin, 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3304, New York, New York, 10118. Defendants The Bank of New York Company, Inc. is a bank holding company organized under the laws of the State of New York, with its headquarters at One Wall Street, New York, New York, 10286. It is one of the largest bank holding companies in the United States.    The Bank of New York is a New York New York banking corporation with its principal place of business at One Wall Street. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BONY Holding, and is the holding company's principal business. BONY is one of the oldest banks in the world, and the sixteenth largest bank in the United States based on total assets.    Joint Stock Bank Inkombank ("Inkombank"), at all relevant times was one of the largest privately owned Russian banks, organized in 1988, existing under the laws of the Russian Federation and having a principal place of business in Moscow, Russia. Inkombank maintained a correspondent banking relationship with BONY and was BONY's largest and most active commercial relationship.. In 1994 Inkombank was infiltrated and eventually dominated by Russian organized figures tied to the Mogilevich Russian organized crime faction.(Note #1) As more fully described below Inkombank collapsed in the latter part of 1998, as a result of systematic looting of bank assets by its officers. In October of 1998 the Central Bank of Russia ("CBR") revoked Inkombank's license to conduct banking business for failure to comply with the banking laws of the Russian Federation, for failing to honor its obligations to creditors, and other improper conduct. Individuals Relevant to This Action    Vladimir I. Doudkin ("Doudkin") at all relevant times was a Russian citizen and a resident of Moscow and Cyprus. At all relevant times Doudkin was one of the principals of Inkombank, holding the title "deputy chairman in charge of international banking." Together with Gurfinkel, Doudkin was the architect of Inkombank's looting and reallocation scheme described below.    Natasha Gurfinkel ("GURFINKEL"), beginning in June 1992 and at all relevant times thereafter, served as  a senior vice president of BONY, in charge of its Eastern Europe Division. Before that, Gurfinkel was vice president and relationship officer for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a section of the Europe division. A native born Russian, she quickly became the pre-eminent Western banking representative in Russian banking and political circles. Gurfinkel was suspended from BONY in August 1999 during the FBI's investigation of BONY's alleged involvement with ROC in money laundering. On February 17, 2000, Gurfinkel filed a lawsuit against BONY and three of its senior officers, Thomas A. Renyi, CEO, Alan R. Griffiths, vice chairman of the board, and Charles E. Rappold II, chief administrative officer, in the Moscow District Court for Savelovsky District. Gurfinkel alleges, inter alia, that BONY and the above named officers libeled her "to cover up for the bank's employees of American origin who indeed were connected with the accounts which are subject of the [FBI] investigation."    Robert (Bob) Klein (KLEIN") at all relevant times held himself out to be "special consultant" for BONY stationed in the Geneva office of BONY's subsidiary-affiliate, Bank of New York - InterMaritime Banque ("BONY-IMB").    Vladimir Viktorovich Vinogradov ("Vinogradov") at all relevant times was and still is a Russian citizen and a resident of Moscow. At all relevant times Vinogradov was Inkombank's chairman and CEO.    Alexei Makarov ("Makarov") at all relevant times was and still is a Russian citizen and a resident of Moscow. At all times, Makarov was one of the principals of Inkombank holding the title of "special consultant to the chairman." Plaintiffs' Investment in Inkombank    In 1993, plaintiffs Morgenthow and Latham ("Morgenthow""), New York International Insurance Group ("New York International"), and Oriental XL Funds ("Oriental" XL") (hereinafter the "investors" or the "plaintiffs"), three private investment trusts, entered into written share purchase agreements with Inkombank, a privately owned Russian bank domiciled in Moscow and organized in 1988 under the laws of the Russian Federation.    Pursuant to the agreements, Morgenthow and Oriental XL each purchased 7,000 shares of Inkombank, and New York International purchased 6,000 shares, representing a total investment of $40 million. The agreements provided that the investors would receive a guaranteed annual return on their investment of 12%, to be paid in the form of dividends.    The agreements also gave the investors the right to have their shares redeemed after 36 months at the price the investors paid for them (the "right to redeem") "at the counters of the Bank of New York".    On June 7, 1996, the Central Bank of Russia ("CBR") issued a report of an audit conducted by CBR task force pursuant to a special order of the CBR No. 23-0-4p of January 9, 1996. The 280 page CBR report was highly critical of Inkombank, noting that the auditors uncovered "multitude of improprieties and illegalities in the activity of Inkombank ... [that] are of such nature that their negative impact appears grave and permanent such which may not be cured by a mere passage of several months." CBR `Auditors also noted the following: - "Inkombank's charter fund is structurally flawed, maintained with numerous violations of law and directives of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The auditors uncovered serious violations in own stock purchases in all four registered stock issues, including violations of foreign exchange laws. The restructuring of the charter fund included numerous practices, which are violative of the rights of bank's shareholders. The investigation revealed a systematic lack of compliance with accounting rules and unjustifiable large credits extended for the accounts of some shareholders." - "No system of formation and utilization of the reserve funds, or the funds of economic incentive exists. These funds are used improperly commingling deposits and credits. According to auditors' calculations the aggregate amount of faulty balances in the first financial report exceeds 197 billion rubles(Note # 2). This includes improper accounting and use of funds in the balance accounts ## 011, 016, and 018, which reflects unjustified increase of the Bank's capital in the amount of at least 37 billion rubles." - "Uncovered were very broad scale transactions involving redemption and sale of the Bank's own shares. During 1995, the Bank redeemed over 686 billion rubles of its own stock shares effecting its charter fund in the amount of 8,6 billion rubles. Transactions on balance account # 034 were not in accordance with accounting rules. Accounting of sale-purchases of its own stock improperly permitted the Bank to decrease its expenses by 247 billion rubles. Infractions in accounting of profits have also permitted the Bank to list as income approximately 207 billion rubles in stock purchases, never actually received. The losses of approximately 445 billion rubles resulting from its redemption of own stock, are improperly listed as assets on balance account # 195 and other balance accounts." - "The Bank's credit policy involves unjustifiable risks. In both the rubles and hard currency loans, the share of unsecured credit is permanently high with significant portion consisting of interest-free credits. The larger portion of funds accounted in the balance accounts ## 195 and 085 (promissory notes in the Bank's portfolio) represent actually extensions of bad loans. Combined with defaulted loans accounted on balance accounts ## 055 and 620, these non-liquid assets listed in the consolidated statement as of 01.01.96 reach approximately 926 billion rubles. According to auditors' estimates this amount, in fact, is approaching 1 trillion rubles because certain portions of the loans, officially declared defaulted are of poor quality, where the interest does not accrue, and were previously extended any number of times. " - "Significant violations of accounting rules is revealed in the accounts # 22 of the statement. Improper accounting transactions resulted in listing of fictitious assets on balance accounts ## 920 and 932 with a consequently distorted picture of Bank's funds on balance account # 018. At the same time, during the second half of 1995, the Bank's income was overstated by tens of billions of rubles." - "Violations are uncovered in accounting for securities transactions, particularly pertaining to the short term Treasury Bills. Distorted picture of Bank's income and expenses were found upon in accounting of investments in corporate securities." - "Accounting of foreign exchange transactions is maintained improperly; special attention must be paid to violations of accounting rules in conversion of dollar-to-ruble income. Bank's estimates of the hard currency is accounted for improperly" - " Based on our analysis, we conclude that if the uncovered violations of accounting of Bank's income and expenses were not present the Bank's financial report for 1995 must show a loss of at least 257 billion rubles, instead of profit of 740,6 billion rubles, as reported by Inkombank." - "Reports of the Bank, specifically those in the form No.2 (profit and loss) reflect distorted financial picture for a number of months." - "Financial situation of the Bank is unstable. It is our opinion that the problem of non-liquidity of its assets have serious consequences for depositors and creditors of the Bank, and further may be exacerbated in the fall when the Bank's obligations to a large number of its depositors mature." - "The Bank's capital is at least ten times lower what the Bank reported on its statement as of 01.01.96. Based on the available data, auditors conclude the law is violated also in accounting Bank's capital. Issues of Inkombank's non-compliance with financial laws and payments into compulsory reserve accounts may be addressed in more details upon thorough examination of depositors' funds, which the Bank aggressively resisted." - "Violations and improprieties revealed by this audit are sufficient to warrant restrictions with respect to Inkombank's accepting deposits from individuals and opening new current accounts for customers other than Bank's shareholders."    Alarmed by the findings of the CBR auditors, plaintiffs made a decision to exercise their right to redeem their shares for the original purchase price. Consequently, by letter dated August 4, 1996, plaintiffs' representative, Vladimir Portnoy ("Portnoy") wrote to Inkombank's chairman Vinogradov: "On behalf of 'Morgenthow and Latham,' 'Oriental XL Funds' and 'New York International Insurance Group,' the undersigned informs you that in accordance with the clause 1.6 of the 'AGREEMENT PURCHASE OF JOINT STOCK BANK INKOMBANK SHARES PAYABLE IN HARD CURRENCY' bearing the date of June 17, 1993, above named companies demand the re-purchase of Inkombank stock issued on the 10th of August of 1993: >Morgenthow and Latham, Ltd.' - 7000 common shares in the amount of US $14 million (certificate # 159/2); 'Oriental XL Funds, Inc.' -7 000 common shares in the amount of US $14 million (certificate # 160/2); and >New York International Insurance Group, S.A.' - 6000 common shares in the amount of US $12 million (certificate o 161/2). We also inform you that in accordance with the clause 2.5.1 the above named companies demand the payment of the guaranteed dividends, calculated as 12% per annum, minus US $522,000, already paid." (Translated from Russian) Copies of the letter were forwarded to Gurfinkel and Klein.    Immediately thereafter, the defendants commenced a concerted effort to convince the investors to withdraw their redemption demand, assuring them that both Inkombank and their investment were safe and sound. Defendants, acting through their senior officers including Gurfinkel, misrepresented material facts which they knew to be false, and induced the plaintiffs to withdraw the exercise of their right to redeem.    Throughout the month of August of 1996, Gurfinkel, Klein, and Makarov had numerous telephone and in-person conferences with plaintiffs' representatives seeking to convince the plaintiffs to leave their investment intact. They emphasized BONY's solidity and stature and BONY's confidence in Inkombank's stability based upon BONY-Inkombank "close relationship" and "long ranging business plans". For example: a: on or about August 7, 1996, Klein telephoned Portnoy. Klein requested that the plaintiffs defer their demand until Inkombank's application for a representative office in the U.S. was approved. When confronted with the CBR report findings, Klein dismissed them as "nonsense" and "political gamesmanship" and assured Portnoy that the plaintiffs' investment was "safe and sound"; b: In mid-August 1996, Gurfinkel in a telephone conversation with plaintiffs' representative, stated that "BONY was aware of the CBR report since March" and that it was BONY's view that the report was "dogshit". Gurfinkel stated that at the behest of BONY's board she personally traveled to Moscow in early June of 1996 to meet with the top CBR officials and to express BONY's views concerning the stability and expanding operations of Inkombank in the United States. Gurfinkel conceded that Inkombank had "temporary liquidity shortness". However, Gurfinkel stated, BONY recently secured approval from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") for the issuance of the BONY's sponsored Inkombank's ADRs. Gurfinkel assured plaintiffs that as soon as the sale of the ADRs begins in September Inkombank will have "more cash than it would know what to do with". In order to further assure plaintiffs, Gurfinkel faxed them a copy of the letter she forwarded to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board dated According to a letter from Gurfinkel to Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan dated April 23, 1996, which gave high praises to Inkombank indicating that it was BONY's "largest and most active commercial relationship". The letter was sent in support of Inkombank's application to establish representative office in New York. Gurfinkel stated that BONY "worked long and hard" on this application and withdrawal of three major shareholders would have adverse consequences in the FRB's decision. "Once Inkombank's New York office is approved our shares would double in value", said Gurfinkel. Finally, Gurfinkel "confided" in the plaintiffs that she and other BONY's officers personally own significant equity in Inkombank stating "would we do that unless we knew this is safe and profitable?"    Defendants knew that the foregoing representations were false but made them nonetheless to induce the plaintiff's to rely thereon.    In fact, the plaintiffs did justifiably rely upon the defendants' misrepresentations and false assurances, based upon, among other things, the stature and credibility of BONY, a major, highly respected U.S. financial institution, and agreed to withdraw their demand to redeem.    nknown to the plaintiffs, at the time of making these representations defendants knew them to be false and knew that Inkombank's senior management was in the process of implementing a scheme, more fully described below, calculated to nullify plaintiffs' shares and convert their investment to the their own use and benefit.    BONY's principal motive for convincing the plaintiffs to leave their investment in Inkombank intact was that to bolster the appearance of Inkombank as a legitimate, financially sound institution, which BONY knew it was not. BONY had a significant financial motivation to prop up its principal Russian correspondent, including: -.   BONY, since early spring of 1992, and until Inkombank's demise in 1998, was Inkombank's chief correspondent bank in the West, handling most of its transactions in hard currency; -.   BONY depended upon Inkombank as its "largest and the most active commercial relationship ", as evidenced by a letter forwarded by BONY's senior vice president, Natasha Gurfinkel, to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan. -.     Inkombank was BONY's "largest generator of fee income" (wire transfer fees), according to BONY internal memo, clearing in excess of 250 payments a day. In the first three months of 1996, BONY's revenues from Inkombank were $720,000.00, not including the significant revenues from Letters of Credit (the "L/C") and FOREX operations ("FX"). In addition BONY earned significant fee income by extending Inkombank credit, including FX and UFTD lines, and posting letters of credit on Inkombank's behalf. -.   In May of 1996, BONY announced its sponsorship of Inkombank's multi-million dollar American Depositary Receipt ("ADR") issue. (Symbol: IKMBY (OTC); CUSIP: 46625ZC101; Effective Date: May 28, 1996) -.   BONY enjoyed Inkombank's management's significant assistance in establishing BONY's presence in Russia, used Inkombank's facilities to collect credit data about other Russian banks and non-banking institutions and, through its referrals, acquired significant number of profitable Russian commercial accounts. Reciprocally, BONY provided Inkombank with introductions to U.S. businesses and governmental agencies, offered to Inkombank to "pick up" its closing accounts, vouched for Inkombank's management's expertise and integrity and lobbied on its behalf before governmental agencies, including the US Federal Reserve Board, US Securities and Exchange Commission, US Department of Agriculture and Eximbank. -.   BONY's senior management had virtually daily interaction with Inkombank's top management(Note # 3) and provided training to numerous Inkombank's managers and employees on all levels. Members of BONY's and Inkombank's senior management frequently traveled to Moscow and New York respectively, enjoying lavish receptions and extravagant entertainment offered by the respective hosts. -.   In sum, the relationship between the top managers of BONY and Inkombank was far greater in scope commercially and far more intimate personally than BONY's mere perfunctory carrying out of Inkombank's SWIFT orders as its banking correspondent. -.   Throughout the above described relationship BONY, as Inkombank's correspondent and transfer agent, effected on behalf of Inkombank, hundreds of thousands of third parties' payments and debits, amounting in the aggregate to billions of dollars per month. For example in the period of November 1 to November 30, 1993, BONY debited Inkombank's correspondent account with BONY #890-0056-96, for 3,131 items aggregating $1,850,262,413.58; from December 1 to December 31, 1993, BONY effected 3,079 payments in the aggregate amount of $2,166,975,944.61.    In sum, Inkombank played a critical role in keeping BONY profitable and in perpetuating BONY as a predominant "player" in the largely corrupt Eastern European banking and industrial markets. Defendants also knew but concealed from the plaintiffs that in April of 1996, BONY was warned by Russian authorities about Inkombank's improprieties and that the Russian authorities questioned the "intimate" relationship between certain BONY's officers, including Gurfinkel, and Inkombank principals.    On October 29, 1998, the Central Bank of Russia (the "CBR"") revoked Inkombank's license to conduct banking business "for failure to comply with the banking laws of the Russian Federation" and for failure to honor its obligations to creditors. Subsequently Inkombank was ordered liquidated. Plaintiffs lost their entire investment. The Marketing of Inkombank's Bolstered Balance Sheet    With the completion of the stock sale and the infusion of cash, the defendants immediately touted Inkombank's improved financials. By letter dated August 18, 1993 from Vinogradov, Inkombank's chairman and CEO, to Dmitry Vladislavovich Tulin, deputy chairman of the CBR, Inkombank reported the $40 million increase of Inkombank's charter fund. In addition, Inkombank's principals gave interviews to major Russian media. As a result, Inkombank's publicly traded shares in Russia rose by 30% in three days.    Plaintiffs' purchase of Inkombank's stock was subsequently reflected in Inkombank's application to establish a representative office in New York, prepared with the active participation of the defendants and submitted in April 1995 to U.S. regulators. The plaintiffs were listed as Inkombank's largest shareholders. The Fraudulent "Reallocation" of the Plaintiff's Shares    In or about early December 1995, Makarov, Klein and Gurfinkel met in Balchuga Hotel in Moscow to discuss the concept of expelling the investors through the "reallocation" of plaintiff's shares to companies owned and/or controlled by Inkombank and certain representatives of BONY. It was decided that Makarov, Klein and Gurfinkel would work out the details of a reallocation and exchange drafts after the holiday season.    By memo dated February 2, 1996, Klein reported to Vinogradov that he had met Gurfinkel in Zurich and exchanged written proposals concerning the re-allocation.    On or about February 8, 1996, Gurfinkel met with Doudkin and Klein in Moscow to further discuss the reallocation scheme. Together they contacted Makarov in Cyprus and asked him to forward the final draft of the "re-allocation" chart via Ciphergraph, a proprietary electronic encryption system which was tailor developed at the commission of Doudkin, Gurfinkel and Klein in late 1992 for the sole purpose of ensuring the secrecy of international wire correspondence amongst the conspirators. On or about February 9, 1996, Makarov sent Gurfinkel a Ciphergram containing a document called "The Chart of Restructuring of the Charter Fund of AB Inkombank (2nd Issue)."(Note # 4) The chart memorialized a proposed scheme of backdated "re-allocation" of the plaintiffs' equity to ten other companies, a number of which were owned and/or controlled by the conspirators and others acting in concert with them. The section of the chart entitled "General Principles of Re-Allocation" identified the steps to be taken in the fraudulent "re-allocation" process, including annulling the plaintiffs' shares and assigning same to re-allocated to 10 new entities, backdating sham re-allocation documents to correspond to the issue of shares to Morgenthow and Latham, Oriental XL Funds and New York International in 1993; securing sham "confirmations" to CBR from BONY and/or BONY-IMB; assigning controlling interest to Aspirations Holdings, Ltd., an Cyprus shell company controlled by the conspirators; redeeming the shares so re-allocated and transferring illicit proceeds as follows: 45% through BONY's London branch and 55% through BONY-IMB.    The "General Principles of Reallocation" section was followed by a table entitled "Principle Sketch," which illustrated how the shares were to be reallocated to the new entities, spelling out (by columns) the name of each "New Shareholder," its "Number of Shares," "Price in Rubles," and "Price in USD." According to the table, the plaintiffs' shares were to be reallocated to: -     JS "Inkom-Invest" - 5,000 shares priced at US $10,000,000.00 -     ADS "Vneshstroykomplex" - 3,000 shares priced at US $6,000,000.00 -      JSC "Nosta" - 2,500 shares priced at US $5,000,000.00 -      Plant "Sokol" - 2,500 shares priced at US $5,000,000.00 -      VO "Oboronexport" - 1,500 shares priced at US $3,000,000.00 -      JS "Stavropolpolimer" - 1,500 shares priced at US $3,000,000.00 -      Aspiration Holdings, Ltd. - 1,200 shares priced at US $2,400,000.00 -      AK "Transneft" - 1,000 shares priced at US $2,000,000.00 -      VAO "Tractoroexport" - 1,000 shares priced at US $2,000,000.00 -      GPVO "Promsyrioimport" - 500 shares priced at US $1,000,000.00 The chart also showed the total number of shares "reallocated" as 19,700, and the total USD price as $39,400,000 -- i.e., 300 shares shy of the number of shares issued to the plaintiffs.    On or about February 16, 1996, Gurfinkel forwarded to Makarov a Ciphergram in reply, stating that she "together with [her] boss" reviewed the chart of backdated "restructuring" and expressed concerns that the sham re-allocation may be detected by both the US and Russian regulators. Gurfinkel stated that she was particularly concerned about assigning significant amounts to Inkominvest "because it is not very difficult to figure out that this is our company, especially considering that we've transferred part of these $40M twice" Similarly, Gurfinkel was expressed concern about Aspirations Holdings stating "we've been beating this company to death in other transactions and nobody has any doubts that this is our marionette." Gurfinkel concluded her communication by stating "Boss is also very concerned that you learned of this [CBR] audit when the auditors were already knocking on your door. Why haven't our people in CBR warned us, so that we could prepare?"    On or about February 17, 1996, Makarov responded by Ciphergraph assuring Gurfinkel that she need not worry because "all that the [CBR] auditors need is the confirmation of funds from a respectable western bank. Makarov also stated that Doudkin "will plant some agreement in English - you know well that nobody in the CBR will engage in translating it." Makarov advised Gurfinkel "calm your boss down and do not panic yourself - everything will be on a high level - the main thing is the BONY's confirmation, which nobody will be able (nor will want) to verify."    Within hours after receiving the above Ciphergram from Makarov, Gurfinkel and Klein had a follow-up telephone conversation with Makarov in which it was agreed to proceed with the "reallocation" as described by Makarov.    In late March of 1996 Klein met Makarov in London to further discuss the details of the re-allocation.    Within a few days, still in March 1996, Gurfinkel met Makarov in Moscow and delivered a copy of the "re-allocation" restructuring chart with handwritten remarks by Gurfinkel and Turitzin, noting that the sham documents to be submitted "as evidence for CBR" should be original and bear "original signatures."    In August 1998, Inkombank defaulted on a series of obligations. In September 1998, the CBR appointed outside administration to oversee Inkombank's affairs. On October 29, 1998, pursuant to Order No. OD-520 of the CBR, Inkombank's license to conduct banking business was revoked "for failure to comply with the banking laws of the Russian Federation, for failing to honor its obligations to creditors, and for defaulting on obligations." Several days before the revocation of Inkombank's license, the Chairman of Inkombank's board, Vladimir Groshev, publicly admitted that the bank's former management "had been placing assets outside of bank's control." Vladimir Dubinin, the then chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, publicly stated that Inkombank had been "looted apart." Vladimir Alekseyev, the then temporary receiver of Inkombank, confirmed that "the best assets of Inkombank were looted" by its former management. And Mr. Ralph-Dieter Montag-Girmes ("Girmes"), a financial consultant retained to assess Inkombank's financial position, publicly stated that "managers of Inkombank had stolen $1.5 billion in recent months through clever paper shuffling," and further: "Inkombank pulled a swindle, in dealing with Western creditors and that's putting it mildly. If they [its former principals] flee the country to pursue a 'quiet life' abroad they would probably be arrested [in the West] even faster than here."     Girmes added that Inkombank had been de facto "bankrupt" since July 1998, noting that in the last days of Inkombank's functioning "employees of [Inkom]bank headquarters in Moscow have been stealing everything from computers to expensive doorknobs..."    Subsequently Inkombank was ordered liquidated. Plaintiffs lost their entire investment.    The wrongful conduct engaged in by defendants was contrary to law, and in violation of their public duties and obligations under U.S. banking laws. The wrongful conduct was flagrant and willful, and shocking to the conscience, and warrants the imposition of punitive damages.   Moreover, defendant's shocking conduct as alleged herein appears to have been but a small component of a broader pattern of fraud and misconduct engaged in by BONY and its officers in connection with their efforts to exploit the emerging and largely corrupt, post-Soviet private banking sector in Eastern Europe. Indeed, after an almost year long investigation jointly conducted by BONY's attorneys and Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, counsel for the BONY shareholders, ("Milberg Weiss"), resulted in amended derivative complaint filed on behalf of BONY's shareholders in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in early September of this year. The shareholder derivative complaint alleges, in painstaking detail, that BONY and its officers engaged in a wide-ranging racketeering conspiracy, together with criminal banking elements in Russia, prominently including corrupt officials of Inkombank, which conspiracy involved a broad range of unlawful and criminal activities, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, tax fraud and asset theft. A true copy of the said pleading is exhibited hereto.    Additionally, two shareholder derivative actions detailing BONY's fraud and misfeasance have also been filed with this Court and are pending in IAS Part 10. The within action is closely related to said pending actions in IAS Part 10 and it is respectfully submitted that discovery in said cases should proceed jointly. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (for fraud)    Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every foregoing allegation of this complaint as if fully set forth here.   Defendants misrepresented and concealed material facts, knowing them to be false in order to induce the plaintiffs not to exercise their right to redeem.    Defendants intended that the plaintiffs rely upon the aforesaid misrepresentations.    Plaintiff's reliance upon defendants' misrepresentations was justified.    As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff's have suffered financial harm.  WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs demand judgment as follows: A. Awarding plaintiff Morgenthow & Latham actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial, presently believed to exceed USD 14,000,000.00 plus the guaranteed return of 12% from January 1994 B. Awarding plaintiff Oriental XL Funds actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial; presently believed to exceed USD 14,000,000.00 plus the guaranteed return of 12% from January 1994 C. Awarding to plaintiff New York International Insurance Group punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; presently believed to exceed USD 12,000,000.00 plus the guaranteed return of 12% from January 1994, D. Awarding each plaintiff punitive damages in the amount to be determined at trial. E. Awarding each plaintiff costs, interests, and reasonable counsel fees. Dated: New York, New York October 24,000 Harold M. Hoffman, Esq. ____________________________ Attorney for Plaintiffs 800 Third Avenue, 29th Floor New York, New York 10022 (t): (212) 486-6322 (f): (212) 980-8748 -and- Alexander Fishkin, LL.M., LL.D 350 Fifth AvenueNew York, New York 10118 (t): 212-695-3151 (f): 212-695-9837 END NOTES (to return to text click "back" on your browser) NOTE 1. Semyon Yukovich Mogilevich ("Mogilevich"), is one of the most notorious figures in the Russian organized crime hierarchy, a twice convicted felon, described by British authorities in one classified report as "one of the world's top criminals" whose income comes from "large-scale extortion, prostitution, arms dealing and drug trafficking." NOTE 2. US$1 at the time equaled approximately 5,000 rubles. NOTE 3. The most senior officers of the BONY and Inkombank frequently met in New York and Moscow. Such included, from Inkombank's side: Vladimir Vinogradov, Chairman, Alexei Kouznetsov, First Deputy Chairman, Vladimir Doudkin, Deputy Chairman, Roman Zdrayevsky, Deputy Chairman, Janna Boulakh, New York Representative, Anna Koursikova, Deputy Chairman and Treasurer; and from BONY's side: Thomas Renyi, President, Natasha Gurfinkel, Senior Vice President, Vladimir Galitzyne, Vice President, Don Wrobel, Don Monks, Sam Shevalier, Paul Turitsin, Tatyana Golubenko Sierant, Senior Administrator of BONY's ADR program, Gerrit B. Parker, Jr., Assistant Treasurer for ADR, Jyrky Talvitie, Vice President (Moscow), L. Edwards, T. Stanford (ADR)NOTE 4. The "2nd Issue" refers to the sale of stock to the investors.

Extradition: from Snowden to Ablyazov, how it works in Italy and U.S.

Extradition: from Snowden to Ablyazov, how it works in Italy and U.S.

Recent political events have seen both the U.S. and Italy dealing with delicate international situations, both country stepping over the thin ice of international diplomacy. One is the already famous case of mr. Snowden and the attempt of the U.S. to have him back in the country, and the other one is the case involving the Kazakh dissident Ablyazov and the misfortunes occurred to his wife and daughter while in Rome.

Without deepening too much in the circumstances (you can easily find any info on the internet – Ablyazov; Snowden), both the cases touched one of the primary institution of the international law system, i.e. the extradition and its discipline. So let's see how it works in the U.S. and in Italy, with our usual comparative perspective.

1. Extradition: general definition

We can say that extradition is the surrender by one state or country of a person charged with a crime in another state or country. Through the extradition process, one sovereign country\state (the requesting one) typically makes a formal request to another sovereign country\state (the requested one). If the fugitive is found within the territory of the requested country\state, then the requested country\state may arrest the fugitive and subject him or her to its extradition process. Between countries, extradition is usually regulated by treaties, since a general principle in international law is that a state does not have any obligation to surrender an alleged criminal to a foreign state, because one principle of sovereignty is that every state has legal authority over the people within its borders. Such absence of international obligation, and the desire for the right to demand such criminals from other countries, have caused a web of extradition treaties or agreements to evolve. When there is no extradition agreement, expulsion can still be pursued through the immigration laws of the host country or, generally, throughout international diplomacy. Many countries (Italy among them) regulate the extradition process via their penal codes in the absence of an extradition agreement.

Is it in fact to remember that no country in the world has an extradition treaty with all other countries.

By enacting laws or in concluding treaties or agreements, countries determine the conditions under which they may entertain or deny extradition requests. Usual limitation or requirements to the extradition process may be:

• Dual criminality: the act for which extradition is sought must constitute a crime punishable by some minimum penalty in both the requesting and the requested parties;
• Political nature of the alleged crime: most countries refuse to extradite suspects accused of committing political crimes in their countries (one extreme and controversial example could be the famous Mitterand doctrine in the '80s );
• Possibility of certain forms of punishment: many countries can refuse extradition on the grounds that the suspect, if extradited, may receive capital punishment or face torture (E.U. Members).
• Principle of specialty: It means that once a person has been surrendered, he or she can be prosecuted or punished only for the crimes for which extradition was requested, and not for any other crimes committed prior to the surrender

Extradition can be active or passive, depending on whether one country is requesting or is requested to extradite the suspect.

2. Extradition in Italy

Article 13 of the Penal Code deals with the extradition discipline, stating that extradition is regulated by the Italian criminal law, treaties and international custom. Italy complies with both the dual criminality and the specialty principles (see above) and, according to the Constitution (art.10 and 26) extradition cannot be conceded for political crimes (genocide and crimes against humanity excluded) and the Supreme Court denied extradition in case the suspect may be punished with the death penalty. In addition, extradition is denied in the case, for the crime it is requested, the suspect will undergo a procedure not respectful of human rights or is likely to face torture or human rights violations.

Both for active and passive extradition procedures, the subject involved is the Minister of Justice. He will be the one requesting the extradition or the subject to whom extradition is requested.

The entire procedure is regulated by articles 697-719 (passive) and 720-722 (active) of the Italian criminal procedure code.

3. Extradition in the U.S.

Differently from Italy, the U.S. are a federal republic, so extradition can operate both between U.S. and foreign countries and between the singular states of the federation. For foreign countries the process is regulated by treaty and conducted between the Federal Government of the United States and the government of a foreign country. The process is considerably different from interstate extradition, or interstate rendition, as mandated by Article 4, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. So we have to divide between interstate extradition and international extradition.

3.1.Interstate extradition

This kind of procedures comes into play when a person charged with a crime under state statutes flees the state. An individual charged with a federal crime may be moved from one state to another without any extradition procedures.

That being said, The Extradition of Fugitives Clause in the Constitution requires States, upon demand of another State, to deliver a fugitive from justice who has committed a “treason, felony or other crime" to the State from which the fugitive has fled. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 sets the process by which an executive of a state, district or territory of the United States must arrest and turn over a fugitive from another state, district or territory (link).

Extradition from one state to another takes place on the order of the governor of the asylum state (the state where the accused is located). The courts in the asylum state have a somewhat limited function in extraditing the accused to the state where she or he is charged with a crime. They determine only whether the extradition documents are in order (e.g., whether they allege that the accused has committed a crime and that she or he is a fugitive) and do not consider the merits of the charge, since the trial of the accused will take place in the state demanding extradition.

The Supreme Court has states that there are only four grounds upon which the Governor of the asylum state may deny another state’s request for extradition: (1) the extradition documents on their face are not in order, (2) the petitioner has not been charged with a crime in the demanding state, (3) the petitioner is not the person named in the request for the extradition, and (4) whether the petitioner is not a fugitive.

3.2.International extradition

The United States has extradition treaties with more than 100 countries (link). Of the treaties most are dual criminality treaties with the remaining being list treaties. A list of countries with which the United States has an extradition treaty relationship can be found in the Federal Criminal Code and Rules, following 18 U.S.C. § 3181.

Foreign requests for extradition of fugitives from the United States are ordinarily submitted by the embassy of the country making the request to the Department of State, which reviews and forwards them to the Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs (OIA). The requests are of two types: formal requisitions supported by all documents required under the applicable treaty, or requests for provisional arrest.

When OIA received a foreign extradition request, in summary, the following occurs:

1. OIA reviews both types of requests for sufficiency and forwards appropriate ones to the district.
   
2. The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case obtains a warrant and the fugitive is arrested and brought before the magistrate judge or the district judge.
   
3. The government opposes bond in extradition cases.
   
4. A hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 is scheduled to determine whether the fugitive is extraditable. If the court finds the fugitive to be extraditable, it enters an order of extraditability and certifies the record to the Secretary of State, who decides whether to surrender the fugitive to the requesting government. In some cases a fugitive may waive the hearing process.
   
5. OIA notifies the foreign government and arranges for the transfer of the fugitive to the agents appointed by the requesting country to receive him or her. Although the order following the extradition hearing is not appealable (by either the fugitive or the government), the fugitive may petition for a writ of habeas corpus as soon as the order is issued. The district court's decision on the writ is subject to appeal, and the extradition may be stayed if the court so orders. (Extradition procedure )
   

When comes to extradition to the U.S., the federal structure of the republic can pose some problems due to the federal hierarchy. For example, most of the criminal prosecution are at a state level, while most of the foreign relationships (like extradition) occur at a federal level. So, if a state wants to prosecute an individual located in a foreign country must direct its extradition request through the federal government, which will negotiate the extradition with the foreign country. However, due to the constraints of federalism, any conditions on the extradition accepted by the federal government — such as not to impose the death penalty — are not binding on individual states (see the European Court of Human Right decision Soering vs. United Kingdom).

That being said, it is always to remember that conceding or denying extradition could be matter of diplomatic opportunism or may depend on particular international strategies or needs. And of course, obtaining the extradition could depend on the forces and the powers involved. Extraditing a suspect could be used as an informal or not usual way of conducting one country's international affairs: from Pinochet to Snowden, passing through Noriega and the Mitterand doctrine, extradition dates back to at least the 13th century BC, and has always been one of the possible ways for sovereign international subjects to declare, affirm, deny or obtain each other's international recognition and respect.

Vocabulary, pt.3

U.S. - Italian legal vocabulary pt. 3

We return with our weekly (or so) appointment with “legalese" and legal expressions.

1.jurisdiction = the legal power, right or authority to hear and determine judicial proceeding = giurisdizione\competenza giurisdizionale

to come under the jurisdiction of =cadere sotto la giurisdizione di

the court entertains jurisdiction=il tribunle è competente

equitable jurisdiction=giurisdizione competente

2.liability = legal responsibility for something = responsabilità.

When someone holds liability is called liable. Remember, one is guilty of crime but liable for a tort. Liability in its plural is liabilities, but in this case liabilities = amount of debt (opposite of assets)

3.petition =request signed by numerous people\ official letter to a law court asking for a legal case to be examined (file a petition) = petizione.

To petition means to ask official organisms to do something.

4.writ =document from a court that orders somebody to do or not to do something = mandato\ordinanza\precetto

writ of summons = citazione a comparire

to issue a wri = emettere un mandato

to serve a writ on somebody =notificare un mandato a qualcuno

5.to advocate =to support or recommend publicly\plead for or speak in favour of = sostenere\ promuovere (una causa).

Similarly to the word “convict” (link), advocate could be the verb we have just seen above (to be read as /ˈædvəˌkeɪt/ ) or the noun (to be read as /ˈædvəkɪt; -ˌkeɪt/), meaning a person who upholds\supports a cause, somebody who intercedes for another, or a person who pleads his client's cause in a court of justice (also synonymous of barrister) = difensore, patrocinatore, sostenitore.

6.claim =cause of an action, demand for money or property = domanda di giudizio, istanza, rivendicazione, reclamo, richiesta

to rebut a claim =confutare una tesi

rightful claim = richiesta legittima

wage claim =rivendicazione salariale

claim for damages =richiesta di risarcimento danni

claim for liability = azione di responsabilità contrattuale

to lay a claim to something = rivendicare un diritto su qualcosa

to lodge a claim =presentare reclamo

to file a claim for losses =presentare domanda di indennizzo

to plead a claim = patrocinare un'istanza

to claim= to demand as being due or as one's property\assert one's title or right to =esigere, rivendiccare, reclamare

to claim damages = chiedere i danni

to claim one's rights =rivendicare i propri diritti.

7.evidence =something\data on which to base proof or establish truth or falsehood = prova

in absence of evidence to the contrary = fino a prova contraria

to give evidence = testimoniare

Prescription and statute of limitation. General differences between Italy and U.S.. The case of private Berlusconi.

Prescription and statute of limitation. General differences  between Italy and U.S..
The case of private Berlusconi. 

The recent events involving the Italian former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and weather or not he could be found guilty by the Corte di Cassazione revolve on one particular juridical topic: prescription. I thought it could be matter of comparative- law discussion.

What is prescription?

In the broadest sense of the word, we can say that prescription denotes the acquisition or extinction of rights by laps of time. Facing this juridical institution we may need to examine some clarifications.

Prescription and limitation

In the field of prescription there are differences in the use of terminology and the definition that are mostly used: prescription itself and limitation. And they can be applied to both civil and criminal law.

The former is often found, although not exclusively, in the civil law context, while the latter is the generally accepted term in common law jurisdictions.

Generally speaking, the fundamental distinction to be made between prescription and limitation appears to depend on whether the issue is if the claimant’s right to bring an action has been barred or if the right in the object has been altered by a duration in another’s possession. Limitation focuses on the action or claim while prescription refers to the impact of the effluxion of time on the underlying right to ownership (in civil cases). Both terms lead to similar objects, the possible extinction of a claim or a right, but prescription appears to be wider because it allows for the possibility of the acquisition of rights (for a deeper and more complete analysis, take a look at this link - although it is about Jersey, it will give you a general academic approach to the issue).

Prescription is a term first found in the Roman Law, and it could- and still can - be acquisitive or extinctive. If it is acquisitive it allows to acquire title to an object or property after a specified period of time; if it is “extinctive” it extinguishes the right of the previous owner or possessor. Thus, the effect of acquisitive prescription is to create a new right.

So we have said that prescription\limitation is the acquisition\extinction of one's right by the passing of time. But can this period of time be interrupted?

In the U.S. legal system there is an institution known as tolling,while in the Italian system we have both interruption and suspension of the prescription period.

The difference between these two types of “interruption” reflects the substantial difference between prescription and limitation in the two legal systems.

We can say that, in the U.S., a statute of limitation (i.e. the enactment that sets the maximum time after an event that legal proceedings based on that event may be initiated ) is a way of determining if a legal action can still be taken. Certain types of legal actions must be started (commenced) within a certain specified period of time.

The Italian criminal law is quite peculiar in this regard, because criminal lawsuits and trials must be ended, rather than started, within such a time limit.For criminal cases, this means that the public prosecutor must prosecute within some time limit. The time limit varies increases with seriousness of the alleged crime. When a time limit is suspended, it does not run (like hitting “stop” on a watch) . When a time limit is interrupted, it is restarted (like hitting reset).

As you can easily imagine, this allows to avoid a guilty sentence by delaying the trial enough for the time limit to expire.

In the U.S. legal system, when the statute of limitations is tolled, it basically means that it is paused or "stops running." With the statute of limitations, the plaintiff\ prosecutor has a limited period of time to commence the action. If they don't commence the action within the period of time, they can't bring it in the future. When the statute of limitations is tolled, the plaintiff\prosecutor will basically get an extension to the period of time they have to start the case.

Certain conditions will toll a statute of limitation, like when the plaintiff is a minor or the person is not physically present in the state that has the jurisdiction.

Going back to the top of the post, in Italy we are having a huge political debate, because the Italian Supreme Court decided to anticipate the hearing of mr. Berlusconi trial on the 30^th of july in order to avoid the prescription of the charges (the crime he is proceed against will fall under prescription in september).

Giving the juridical infos above provided, you can easily deduct that in the U.S. this would not have represented a problem, since once the action has been started within the right time, it cannot be barred by prescription in the future. And that maybe, in the U.S., the former prime minister's private judicial events would not thwart nor condition the political life of the country in such a delicate time.

Jury, pt.3. Jury Nullification: legal and cultural perspective.

Jury, pt. 3
Jury Nullification: legal and cultural perspective.

Since the presence of the jury is one of the main differences between the Italian and the U.S. legal system (if not the most evident distinction between a civil and a common law system), it requires more then only one post. Plus, in one of the previous posts (Jury pt.2), we left with the promise of analyzing this particular power of the jury: the nullification.

First of all, what is it?

According to quite every legal dictionary you will look up, the jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged.The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate that are charged with deciding.

The american jury draws its power of nullifications form a series of rights, such as rendering a general verdict in criminal trials, the inability of criminal courts to direct a verdict no matter how strong the evidence, the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause, which prohibits the appeal of an acquittal, and the fact that jurors can never be punished for the verdict they return.

Jury nullification is most often, although rarely, exercised in criminal trials but technically is applicable to civil trials as well, where it is subject to civil procedural remedies such as Judgment not withstanding the verdict.

As many of you may have noticed, this power implies that the jury can decide about the application of the law, a tasks usually demanded to the judge (for a fast recap, see Jury pt.1). Indeed we can say that, when pronouncing a nullification, the jury de facto introduces its own interpretation of the law and/or disregards the law entirely in reaching a verdict. Which is a strong exception to the general division of power between judges (the ones applying the law) and jurors (triers of fact).

To better understand this particular power (indeed the most widely accepted understanding of jury nullification by the courts is one that acknowledges the power but not the right of a juror or jury to nullify the law) it may come in handy brushing up on some historical background.

Jury nullification dates back to the early U.S. history, when the colonists struggle to fashion a legal system applicable to them. Colonists lived under what they deemed an undemocratic, tyrannical government. The jury became a shield, where colonists could be judged by members of their own communities, and it was considered their only means for democratic expression. Second, the entire premise of democracy, in both pre- and post-independence days, demanded popular control of all facets of government. There was also a practical side to granting juries such unyielding control of trials: early colonial judges were essentially laymen selected from among their peers, and they often knew no more law than did the jurors (legal dictionary).

Once the U.S. established their own independent form of government, the will of people became expressed through democratic election and the enactment of their own laws. Nullifying the law would so represent a frustration of the popular will and the issue became essentially moot.

Its practice has reappeared whenever the government has tried to enforce unpopular or morally repugnant laws; historical examples include the Alien and Seditions Acts (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alien_and_Sedition_Acts), the Fugitive Slaves Acts (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fugitive_Slave_Act_of_1850), during Prohibition or the Vietnam War.

Notwithstanding a judiciary that denied jurors the right to nullify, over the years, jurors have continued to use their power to do so. The power is most often wielded when jurors believe that an acquittal is justified for reasons that the law does not officially recognize.

It is worthy to underline that, due to the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause (which prohibits the appeal of an acquittal), jury nullification can be a defense strategy (Clay S. Conrad (1995), Jury Nullification as a Defense Strategy).

As always, the end of a post set the topic for the next one.

P.S. 

Of course, given the specific nature of this topic (the jury), there is no particular comparative observation to add to those we already made when we first analyze the institution of the jury (Jury pt.1).

Vocabulary pt.2 : nouns of crimes and U.S murder classification

U.S. -Italian legal vocabulary, pt.2

Nouns of crimes and U.S. murder classification.

As promised, we continue to improve our (your) legalese with some terms and expressions. This time is matter of nouns of crimes.

arson = setting fire to a building = incendio

assassination = killing a public figure intentionally

assault = acting in a way as to make someone believe he\she will be hurt

bigamy = getting married when you are still married to someone else = bigamia

blackmail = getting money\personal advantage from people by threatening to publicize facts they don't want to reveal = not dissimilar to estorsione

bribery = offering money corruptly to get someone to do something for you = corruzione

burglary =entering a building illegally and committing an offense = violazione di domicilio

embezzlement =the crime of stealing the funds or property of an employer, company or government or misappropriating money or assets held in trust = similar to appropriazione indebita

espionage =the crime of spying on the federal government and/or transferring state secrets on behalf of a foreign country. The other country need not be an "enemy," so espionage may not be treason, which involves aiding an enemy = spionaggio (these days breaking news with the Snowden case)

extortion = threatening a victim's property or loved ones through intimidation or false claim in order to obtain money or property = estorsione

forgery = counterfeiting or otherwise altering a document, records, identity, signature etc with an intention to fake the document and draw undue benefit from that act = similar to contraffazione

fraud = doing of any wrong activity with an intention to gain undue or illegitimate advantages at the detriment of the sufferer = frode

libel = writing, publishing or broadcasting a statement which damages someone's character = diffamazione

manslaughter =killing or cause to death of a person without a pre-meditation or intention to kill or cause death, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In manslaughter there is no intention or pre-plan to kill but killing or death occurred due to an impulsive act or a careless act= omicidio preterintenzionale

murder = killing or death of a person by another sane person unlawfully and proved to be under no authority to kill or with the intent of killing the other because of malice or revenge. Murders fetch highest of punishments.The forms of murders are different and described separately in court of law, depending on which they are termed first degree or second degree murders where the punishment level differs. If the death is intentional and pre planned, it is a first degree murder. It can also be a result of negligence or recklessness, where a heavy bodily harm may or may not be intended, will have less serious impact, though still a serious matter = omicidio volontario, different from a negligent homicide (= omicidio colposo) because of the mental state (mens rea) of the murderer

perjury = giving a false information or statement which was testified under the oath = falsa testimonianza

piracy =unauthorized use or appropriation of patented or copyrighted material = pirateria

slander = saying something that damages someone's reputation = ingiuria. Same thing as libel, but libel is written, while slander is oral

smuggling = illegal transportation of goods or person across an international border = contrabbando

theft =stealing\ taking someone else's property = furto

treason = treachery, betrayal to ones own country usually by the way of supporting and purposely aiding the enemies = tradimento

Like in every other country (almost every), also in the U.S. crimes are classified by their gravity. In U.S. they are divided between felony and misdemeanor. The federal government defines a felony as a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. If punishable by exactly one year or less, it is classified as a misdemeanor (US Code).

It can be compared with the distinction between delitti and contravvenzioni made by the Italian penal code on the grounds of the punishment applicable.

Another point worth of being analyzed here is how an homicide can be classified according to its gravity and course of action. At base, murder consists of an intentional unlawful act with a design to kill and fatal consequences. Under U.S. federal law, murder is classified as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought (=premeditazione) (definition). Malice is the intention to kill, and can be expressed or implied (similar to italian dolo).

States have adopted several different schemes for classifying murders by degree. The most common separates murder into two degrees, and treats voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as separate crimes that do not constitute murder.

first degree murder: any murder that is willful and premeditated (definition);

second degree murder: not premeditated or planned in advance (definition);

voluntary manslaughter: intentional killing in which the offender had no prior intent to kill, such as a killing that occurs in the "heat of passion." The circumstances leading to the killing must be the kind that would cause a reasonable person to become emotionally or mentally disturbed (definition);

involuntary manslaughter: unintentional killing that results from recklessness or criminal negligence, or from an unlawful act that is a misdemeanor or low-level felony. The victim is unintended (definition.

Some states classify their murders differently. In Pennsylvania, California, and Massachusetts, first degree murder encompasses premeditated murders, second degree murder encompasses accomplice liability , and third degree serves as a catch-all for other murders. In New York, first-degree murder involves "special circumstances," such as the murder of a police officer or witness to a crime, multiple murders, or murders involving torture.Under this system, second degree murder is any other premeditated murder. The New York statutes also recognize "murder for hire" as first degree murder.Texas uses a similar scheme to New York, but refers to first-degree murder as "capital murder," a term which typically applies only to those crimes that merit the death penalty. Some states, such as Florida, do not separate the two kinds of manslaughter (illinois first degree; illinois second degree).



In opposition to this classification, the Italian system divides the homicide into three categories: omicidio volontario, omicidio preterintenzionale and omicidio colposo, depending on the fact if the death was wanted, was the unwanted consequence of battery or other crimes, or it was caused out of negligence.